Production API Governance on AceDataCloud

A production API key is not just a secret string. It is a control point for who can call what, how much they can consume, how long access lasts, which application pays, and how an incident can be traced.

AceDataCloud exposes those controls across four connected layers:

  1. Credential issuance — create a key for a specific Application.
  2. Application balance policy — determine where usage is deducted and what happens when quota is low.
  3. Usage observability — trace status, cost, latency, API, Application, and credential.
  4. Credential lifecycle — update restrictions, rotate secrets, and revoke access.

Production API governance control loop

This guide turns the platform’s individual management APIs into one practical operating model.

First, separate the two kinds of credentials

AceDataCloud uses different credentials for different surfaces:

Credential Used for Typical host
Account Token / Platform Token Account management: Applications, credentials, balances, usage, orders platform.acedata.cloud/api/v1/**
API Credential Calling business APIs for a service api.acedata.cloud/**

They are not interchangeable. A business API credential should not be used to call management endpoints, and a Platform Token should not be embedded in an application as its business API key.

This separation creates a useful security boundary:

  • Keep Platform Tokens in a tightly controlled operations environment.
  • Give each workload its own API Credential.
  • Let runtime services call only the business APIs they need.
  • Let CI or an administrative service perform credential and balance management.

Issue one credential per workload and environment

Create a credential with POST https://platform.acedata.cloud/api/v1/credentials/ using an Account Token.

A minimal production-oriented request can include a display name, independent consumption limit, expiry, and API allowlist:

curl -X POST 'https://platform.acedata.cloud/api/v1/credentials/' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${PLATFORM_TOKEN}" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{
    \"application_id\": \"${APPLICATION_ID}\",
    \"name\": \"prod-support-agent\",
    \"limited_amount\": 100,
    \"expired_at\": \"2027-01-01T00:00:00Z\",
    \"allowed_api_ids\": [\"${CHAT_API_ID}\"],
    \"metadata\": {\"environment\": \"production\", \"owner\": \"support-platform\"}
  }"

The creation contract supports:

Field Governance purpose
application_id Binds usage to the target Application
name Makes the workload identifiable in audits
limited_amount Sets an independent credential usage limit; null means no independent limit
expired_at Establishes automatic time-bounded access
allowed_api_ids Restricts the credential to selected APIs
host Stores credential host information where applicable
for_user_id Lets an Application owner issue delegated credentials for another user
tags / metadata Records environment, team, system, or change-ticket context

An empty allowed_api_ids array is normalized to no restriction. Do not send an empty array when your intention is “allow nothing.” Use a real API allowlist.

API/Agent services normally return a Token credential. Proxy services normally return a username/password identity, and a Proxy Application allows only one credential.

Treat the creation response as sensitive. Save the secret immediately in a password manager or secret manager and do not write the response to logs. Clients should not depend on plaintext secrets remaining retrievable later; lifecycle APIs may return masked values.

Use limits as blast-radius controls, not budgeting alone

A credential-level limited_amount is useful for containing a leaked key or a runaway workload, but it is only one part of cost governance.

A robust hierarchy is:

  • Credential limit: maximum exposure for one workload.
  • Application balance: quota available to the subscribed service Application.
  • Global balance policy: optional fallback for eligible pay-as-you-go Applications.
  • Overdraft authorization: a separate, read-only platform authorization that customers cannot enable themselves.

Do not treat these as equivalent.

For example, even when an Application has available quota, an individual credential limit can still block the workload. Conversely, enabling global balance sharing may let an eligible Application continue after its own balance is insufficient—but it does not remove credential limits, disablement, or expiry checks.

Monitor balance with unit and status

Query an Application with:

curl --fail-with-body \
  "https://platform.acedata.cloud/api/v1/applications/${APPLICATION_ID}" \
  -H 'Accept: application/json' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${PLATFORM_TOKEN}"

The fields that matter operationally include:

  • remaining_amount — current Application quota; a negative value indicates quota pending settlement.
  • used_amount — accumulated usage reported for the Application.
  • service.unit — the unit, such as Credit, Count, or Token.
  • disabled — whether the Application is disabled.
  • expired_at — whether subscription access has expired.
  • allow_overdraft — read-only indication of administrator-approved overdraft.

Never assume the amount is US dollars. Alert thresholds must be defined in the service’s actual unit.

A positive balance alone does not prove availability. Your health check should evaluate balance, disabled, expiry, credential limits, and service status. For Proxy services, balance synchronization can be suspended or time out, in which case the most recently saved balance may be returned.

A concise Python check:

import os
import requests

minimum = float(os.getenv("MINIMUM_BALANCE", "10"))
url = f"https://platform.acedata.cloud/api/v1/applications/{os.environ['APPLICATION_ID']}"
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {os.environ['PLATFORM_TOKEN']}"}

response = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=10)
response.raise_for_status()
application = response.json()

remaining = application.get("remaining_amount")
unit = application.get("service", {}).get("unit", "unknown")

if application.get("disabled"):
    raise RuntimeError("Application is disabled")
if application.get("expired_at"):
    print("Check whether the Application expiry has passed:", application["expired_at"])
if remaining is None:
    raise RuntimeError("No balance is available for this Application")
if not application.get("allow_overdraft", False) and float(remaining) < minimum:
    raise RuntimeError(f"Low balance: {remaining} {unit}")

For multiple services, fetch the Application list once and evaluate each item locally instead of polling every Application detail endpoint at high frequency.

Decide explicitly whether global balance sharing is allowed

Eligible pay-as-you-go Applications can be configured to use the account’s global balance when their own balance is insufficient:

curl -X POST \
  "https://platform.acedata.cloud/api/v1/applications/${APPLICATION_ID}/update-allow-consume-global/" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${PLATFORM_TOKEN}" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"allow_consume_global": true}'

Use the returned allow_consume_global value as the source of truth. Do not assume the requested value was saved.

Important constraints:

  • Period Applications cannot consume the global balance; the server keeps the field false.
  • An owned application_id and Account Token are required.
  • If allow_overdraft=true, a pay-as-you-go Application can continue deducting from its own balance below zero and will not switch to global balance merely because its own balance is insufficient.
  • When fallback occurs, the overdraft behavior is determined by the global Application that actually pays.

Global fallback improves continuity, but it also broadens financial blast radius. Enable it as a deliberate service-level policy, not as a default convenience.

Trace every production call by credential

AceDataCloud retains API call records and billing summaries for the most recent 60 days. Request and response bodies are retained for 30 days; records from days 30–60 retain summaries but no longer return full metadata.request and metadata.response bodies.

Query the latest records at:

curl --get 'https://platform.acedata.cloud/api/v1/usage/apis/' \
  --data-urlencode "application_id=${APPLICATION_ID}" \
  --data-urlencode "credential_id=${CREDENTIAL_ID}" \
  --data-urlencode 'perspective=both' \
  --data-urlencode 'limit=100' \
  --data-urlencode 'ordering=-created_at' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${PLATFORM_TOKEN}"

Useful filters include application_id, api_id, credential_id, status_code, and ISO 8601 time bounds. The perspective parameter separates three views:

  • billing — calls paid for by the current account.
  • actor — calls actually initiated by the current account.
  • both — the default union of paid-for and initiated calls.

Key fields for incident response are:

Field Operational use
credential_id Identify the exposed or malfunctioning workload
trace_id Investigate one request end to end
status_code Separate successful and failed calls
elapsed Track latency
used_amount Usage calculated under original rules
original_amount Usage before Application discounts
deducted_amount Final amount actually deducted
remaining_amount Application quota after the charge
actor_user_id / user_id Distinguish the caller from the account responsible for payment

For large queries, use shorter windows—preferably one day or less—and add filters. If an identical query is already running, the API can return 429 usage_query_in_progress; follow Retry-After with backoff. A 503 usage_query_timeout is a signal to narrow the request rather than immediately repeating it.

Build a rotation and incident workflow before you need it

A practical response playbook is:

  1. Identify the credential from the usage record or service configuration.
  2. Contain exposure by lowering its limit, changing its expiry, narrowing allowed_api_ids, or revoking it.
  3. Rotate the secret and update the secret manager.
  4. Deploy the new value to the workload without logging it.
  5. Verify successful calls under the expected credential ID.
  6. Review recent records by credential, status, API, and trace ID.
  7. Revoke obsolete credentials after the cutover is confirmed.

Create separate credentials for development, staging, production, scheduled jobs, and third-party integrations. This makes rotation local and attribution clear. A single shared “production” key maximizes both outage risk and investigative ambiguity.

For each production workload:

  • Dedicated API Credential; no cross-environment sharing.
  • Descriptive name and ownership metadata.
  • API allowlist containing only required endpoint IDs.
  • Independent consumption limit proportional to expected workload.
  • Expiration date with a planned renewal window.
  • Secret stored in a secret manager and excluded from logs.
  • Application balance alert in the correct service unit.
  • Checks for disablement and expiry, not balance alone.
  • Explicit decision on allow_consume_global.
  • Usage dashboard filtered by Application and credential.
  • Trace IDs captured in application logs.
  • Documented rotate-and-revoke procedure.

Governance is a loop

Credential issuance, balance monitoring, and usage tracing should not be managed as separate chores. Together they form a continuous control loop:

issue narrowly → monitor the paying Application → trace actual calls → rotate or revoke quickly.

AceDataCloud’s management APIs expose the fields needed to implement that loop without conflating management access, runtime access, quota, and billing attribution. The result is not merely a safer API key; it is a production system with bounded exposure and explainable usage.

Official resources